1/17/2003 12:43:00 AM | Justin RE: More on Iraq... As Brad Plumer points out, Mr. Kallmann has posted a criticism of my last posting on the Dartmouth observer. Mr Kallmann's posting is entitled "A problem with percentages", and is here: http://dartobserver.blogspot.com(Sunday, January 12, 2003) Anyway, let me address some of the issues Kallmann brings up. He argues that UNSCOM claims of 90-95% disarmament are conjectures based only on the weapons that they know exist, and not on the weapons/production plant that could possibly be hidden away somewhere. Admittedly, it is difficult to argue with an opinion whose very premise is non-evidence. I ask him though, is there any country for which this type of argument could not be used to justify invading? What about all those undocumented nuclear weapons up in Canada and Greenland that no one can conclusive prove do not exist? Once we let ourselves degenerate to the "absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence" style reasoning of the administration, then there can simply be no limits on US military action. The very fact that the government has resorted to these irrational tactics is testimony to the weakness of their case for military action. Furthermore, Mr. Kallmann incorrectly suggests that the dissident UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter was alone on UNSCOM in claiming that Iraq was "90-95%" disarmed when the inspectors left in 1998: "In fact, Ritter is more of an exception than the norm among the previous inspectors," Kallmann says. Not true. The UNSCOM chief also corraborated Ritter's assessment at the time: "If Iraq disarmament were a five-lap race, we would be three quarters of the way around the fifth and final lap." UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler, July 1998. This statement actually suggests that Iraq was 95% disarmed, which is more than even Ritter had said at the time. Mr. Kallmann also introduces the congressional testimonies of former weapons inspectors Dr. Kay, and Dr. Spertzel, who claim that Iraq could never be disarmed through weapons inspection. In considering these congressional testimonies, it's important to note that by 1998 the US had succeeded in infiltrating UNSCOM with a large number of spies dedicated more to planning coups and echoing whatever the US government happened to be saying at the time. These aren't mere allegations. This was reported as fact by the New York Times, The Boston Globe, The Washington Post, and USA Today in 1998 (see the fair.com link from my previous posting). This in mind, it is not too surprising to hear these same US UNSCOM recruits testifying in Washington's defense. However, judging from the way Ritter describes Spertzel's actions on the weapons inspections team, it appears that Spertzel was intentionally subverting the UN inspections regime in order to make it look ineffective to the international community. According to Ritter, Spertzel repeatedly refused to perform inspections for biological agents in key areas, so that the US government could still continue to say certain areas hadn't been inspected. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twr147e.htmAs far as I can tell, Spertzel has not denied this allegation. In my opinion, Spertzel's refusal to even inspect the areas that the US government was claiming held Iraqi weapons of mass destruction greatly damages his credibility as a neutral source on this matter. Lastly, there are some basic facts about weapons of mass destruction that can be used to counter the sort of fear-mongering we're hearing: 1) Creation and testing of both chemical and nuclear weapons is detectable via satellite. 2) Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons often leave traces in labs after they are moved, which makes it hard for Iraq to simply "move stuff around". 3) Chemical and biological weapons produced more than 5 years ago would have degraded and become useless. 4) Scientists have to work in these facilities, and they have to have decent equipment which all needs to get through the strict sanctions regime. All of this can be traced. So weapons inspections aren't so useless as some would make them seem. After all, according to most sources inspections have done much more disarm Iraq then bombing has. Besides, even if we do eliminate Saddam Hussein, who is to say that the weapons of mass destruction we envision him having will end up in our hands? If they're really so well hidden, it seems likely they would just end up on the black market. The future of Iraq after war is the least predictable scenario, and perhaps also the most ominous. perma link |
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